As advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) demonstrate unprecedented levels of performance in many critical applications, their vulnerability to attacks is still an open question. Adversarial examples are small modifications of legitimate data points, resulting in mis-classification at testing time. As DNNs found a wide range of applications to cyber security analytics, it becomes important to study the robustness of these models in this setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has reached super-human performance in machine learning (ML) tasks for classification in diverse domains, including image classification, speech recognition, and natural language processing. Still, deep neural networks (DNNs) are not robust in face of adversarial attacks, and their vulnerability has been demonstrated extensively in many applications, with the majority of work in adversarial ML being performed in image classification tasks (e.g, [4] , [9] , [12] , [24] , [36] , [41] , [45] , [55] ).
ML started to be used more extensively in cyber security applications in academia and industry, with the emergence of a a new field called security analytics. Among the most popular applications of ML in cyber security we highlight malware classification [5] , [8] , [47] , malicious domain detection [3] , [6] , [11] , [40] , [43] , and botnet detection [27] , [56] . In most of these applications, the raw security datasets (network traffic or host logs) are not used directly as input to the DNN, but instead an intermediate feature extraction layer is defined by domain experts to generate inputs for neural networks (or other ML models). There are efforts to automate the feature engineering aspect (e.g., [32] , but it is not yet a common practice. One of the challenges of adapting ML to work in these domains is the large class imbalance during training [6] . Therefore, adversarial attacks designed on continuous domains (for instance, in image classification) need to be adapted to take into account the specifics of cyber security applications.
Initial efforts to design adversarial attacks at testing time (called evasion attacks) for discrete domains are underway in the research community. Examples include PDF malware detection [53] , [57] and malware classification [26] , [54] , but these applications use binary features. Recently, Kulynych et al. [35] introduce a graphical framework for general evasion attacks in discrete domains, that constructs a graph of all possible transformations of an input and selects a set of minimum cost to generate an adversarial example. The previous work, however, cannot yet handle evasion attacks in security applications that respect complex feature dependencies, as well as physical-world constraints.
In this paper we introduce a novel framework for crafting adversarial attacks in cyber security domain that respects the mathematical dependencies given by common operations applied in feature space and enforces at the same time the physical-world constraints of specific applications. At the core of our framework is an iterative optimization method that determines the feature of maximum gradient of attacker's objective at each iteration, identifies the family of features dependent on that feature, and modifies consistently all the features in the family, while preserving an upper bound on the maximum distance and respecting the physical-world application constraints.
Our general framework has the advantage of being applicable to existing security applications to test their robustness. There is a minimum amount of adaptation that is required for a new application, but most of the building blocks are reusable across applications. To demonstrate this, we apply our framework to two distinct applications. The first is a malicious network traffic classifier for botnet detection (using a public dataset [22] ), in which an attacker can insert network connections on ports of his choice that respect the physical network constraints (e.g., TCP and UDP packet sizes) and a number of mathematical dependencies. The second application is malicious domain classification using features extracted from web proxy logs (collected from a large enterprise) that involves a number of statistical and mathematical dependencies in feature space. We demonstrate that the attacks are successful arXiv:1909.10480v1 [cs.CR] 23 Sep 2019 in both applications, with minimum amount of perturbation. For instance, by inserting 12 network connections an attacker can change the classification prediction from Malicious to Benign in the first application. We perform detailed evaluation to test: (1) if our attacks perform better than several baselines; (2) if the selection of the optimization objective impacts the attack success rate; (3) how the imbalance ratio between the Malicious and Benign classes in training changes the success of the attack; (4) if features modified by the attack are the features with highest importance.
To summarize, our contributions are: 1) We introduce a general evasion attack framework for cyber security that respects mathematical feature dependencies and physical-world constraints. 2) We apply our framework with minimal adaptation to two distinct applications: malicious network connection classifier, and malicious domain detector, to generate feasible adversarial examples in these domains. 3) We demonstrate that our methods perform better than several baselines at creating adversarial examples with smaller distance to the original data points. 4) We extensively evaluate our proposed framework for these applications and quantify the amount of effort required by the attacker to bypass the classifiers, for different optimization objectives and training data imbalance ratios.
Organization. We provide background material on DNNs and evasion attacks in Section II. We discuss the challenges for designing adversarial attacks in cyber security and introduce our general framework in Section III. We instantiate our framework for the two applications of interest in Section IV. We extensively evaluate our framework for the two applications in Sections V and VI, respectively. Finally, we discuss related work in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND A. Deep Neural Networks for Classification
A feed-forward neural network (FFNN) for binary classification is a function y = F (x) from input x ∈ R d (of dimension d) to output y ∈ {0, 1}. The parameter vector of the function (usually denoted θ) is learned during the training phase using back propagation over the network layers. Each layer includes a matrix multiplication and non-linear activation (e.g., ReLU). The last layer's activation is sigmoid σ for binary classification: y = F (x) = σ(Z(x)), where Z(x) are the logits, i.e., the output of the the penultimate layer. We denote by C(x) the predicted class for x. For multi-class classification, the last layer uses a softmax activation function with as many neurons as the number of classes. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) use similar architectures and operations, with the requirement of including a convolution operation in at least one layer.
B. Threat Model
Adversarial attacks against machine learning algorithms can be developed in either the training or testing phase. In this work, we consider testing-time attacks, called evasion attacks. The DNN model is trained correctly and the attacker's goal is to create adversarial examples at testing time. In security settings, typically the attacker starts with Malicious points that he aims to minimally modify into adversarial examples classified as Benign. We only consider here the modification of Malicious to Benign prediction, but not the reverse (Benign to Malicious), since that is a denial-of-service attack we do not consider here.
We assume the strongest attack model, the white-box attack, in which the attacker has full knowledge of the ML system. White-box attacks have been considered extensively in previous work, e.g., [9] , [12] , [24] , [41] to evaluate the robustness of existing ML classification algorithms. We follow a similar trend and consider white-box evasion attacks to analyze the robustness of DNNs in cyber security under worstcase conditions. In the future, we plan to analyze weaker and more practical adversarial models, including black-box attacks with minimal knowledge of the ML system (such as [44] ).
C. Evasion Attacks against Deep Neural Networks
We describe several evasion attacks against DNNs: projected gradient descent-based attacks and the penalty-based attack of Carlini and Wagner.
Projected gradient attacks. This is a class of attacks based on gradient descent for objective minimization, that project the adversarial points to the feasible domain at each iteration. For instance, Biggio et al. [9] use an objective that maximizes the confidence of adversarial examples, within a ball of fixed radius in L 1 norm. Madry et al. [41] use the loss function directly as the optimization objective and use the L 2 and L ∞ distances for projection. C&W attack. Carlini and Wagner [12] solve the following optimization problem to create adversarial example against CNNs used for multi-class prediction:
where Z() are the logits of the DNN. This is called the penalty method, and the optimization objective has two terms: the norm of the perturbation δ, and a function h(x + δ) that is minimized when the adversarial example x + δ is classified as the target class t. This two objectives are balanced by constant c, determined by performing a grid search. The attack works for L 0 , L 2 , and L ∞ norms.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we start by describing the classification setting in cyber security analytics. Then we devote the majority of the section to describe evasion attacks for cyber security, mention challenges of designing them, and presenting our new attack framework that takes into consideration the specific constraints of security applications.
A. Machine learning classification in cyber security
In standard computer vision tasks such as image classification, the raw data (image pixels) is used directly as input into the neural network models. The promise of deep learning is end-to-end learning, including learning feature representations from the raw data. Deep learning is extremely successful at achieving this for image, text, and speech applications. In contrast, in cyber security, domain expertise is still required to generate intermediate features from the raw data (e.g., network traffic or endpoint data) (see Figure 1 ).
Machine learning is commonly used in cyber security for classification of Malicious and Benign activity (see for example previous work in this space [11] , [40] , [43] ). A raw dataset R is initially collected (for example, pcap files or Netflow logs), and feature extraction is performed by applying different operators, such as Max, Min, Avg, and Total. The training dataset D tr has N training examples: 
B. Limitations and challenges
Existing evasion attacks are mostly designed and tested for image classification, where adversarial examples have pixel values in a fixed range (e.g., [0,1]) and can be modified independently in continuous domains [4] , [12] , [41] . However, most security datasets are discrete, resulting in feature dependencies and physical-world constraints to ensure certain application functionality.
Several previous work address evasion attacks in discrete domains. The evasion attack for malware detection by Grosse et al. [25] , which directly leverages JSMA [45] , modifies binary features corresponding to system calls. Kolosnjaji et al. [33] use the attack of Biggio et al. [9] to append selected bytes at the end of the malware file. Suciu et al. [54] also append bytes in selected regions of malicious files. Kulynych et al. [35] introduce a graphical framework in which an adversary constructs all feasible transformation of an input, and then uses graph search to determine the path of minimum cost to generate an adversarial example.
Neither of these approaches are applicable to our general setting. First, in the considered applications features have numerical values and the evasion attacks developed for malware binary features [25] , [33] , [54] are not applicable. Second, none of these attacks guarantees the feasibility of the resulting adversarial vector in terms of mathematical relationships between features. We believe that crafting adversarial examples that are feasible, and respect all the application constraints and dependencies to be a significant challenge. Once application constraints are specified, the resulting optimization problem for creating adversarial examples includes a number of nonlinear constraints and cannot be solved directly using out-ofthe-box optimization methods.
C. Overview of our approach
To address these issues, we introduce a framework for evasion attacks that preserves a range of feature dependencies and guarantees that the produced adversarial examples are within the feasible region of the domain. Our framework supports two main types of constraints: Mathematical feature dependencies: These are dependencies created in the feature extraction layer. For instance, by applying several mathematical operators (Max, Min, Total) over a set of raw log data, we introduce feature dependencies. See the example in Figure 2 for Bro connection log events and several dependent features constructed using these operators. For instance, a Bro connection includes the number of packets sent and received, and we define the Min, Max, and Total number of packets sent and received by the same source IP on a particular port (within a fixed time window). We use the terminology family of features to denote a subset of features that are inter-connected and need to be updated simultaneously. For the Bro example, the features defined for each port (e.g., 80, 53, 22) are dependent as they are generated from all the connections on that port. Physical-world constraints: These are constraints imposed by the real-world application. For instance, in the case of network traffic, a TCP packet has a maximum size of 1500 bytes.
Our starting point for the attack framework are gradientbased optimization algorithms, including projected [9] , [41] and penalty-based [12] . Of course, we cannot apply these attacks directly since they will not preserve the feature dependencies. To overcome this, we use the values of the objective gradient at each iteration to select features of maximum gradient values. We create feature-update algorithms for each family of dependencies that use a combination of gradientbased method and mathematical constraints to always maintain a feasible point that satisfies the constraints. We also use various projection operators to project the updated adversarial examples to feasible regions of the feature space.
D. Proposed Evasion Attack Framework
We introduce here our general evasion attack framework for creating adversarial examples at testing time for binary classifiers. In the context of security applications, the main goal of the attacker is to ensure that a Malicious data point is classified as Benign after applying a minimum amount of perturbation to it. We consider binary classifiers designed using FFNN architectures and the strongest adversarial model, i.e., a white-box attack with knowledge of the ML process. For measuring the amount of perturbation added by the original example, we use the L 2 norm. Algorithm 1 describes the general framework. The input consists of: an input sample x with label y (typically Malicious in security applications); a target label t (typically Benign); the model prediction function C; the optimization objective G; maximum allowed perturbation d max ; the subset of features F S that can be modified; the features that have dependencies F D ⊂ F S ; the maximum number of iterations M and a learning rate α for gradient descent. The set of features with dependencies are split into families of features. A family is defined as a subset of F D such that features within the family need to be updated simultaneously, whereas features outside the family can be updated independently.
The algorithm proceeds iteratively. The goal is to update the data point in the direction of the gradient (to minimize the optimization objective), while preserving the family dependencies, as well as the physical-world constraints. In each iteration, the gradients of all modifiable features are computed, and the feature of maximum gradient is selected. The update of the data point x in the direction of the gradient is performed as follows:
1. If the feature of maximum gradient belongs to a family with other dependent features, function UPDATE FAMILY is called (line 10). Inside the function, the representative feature for the family is computed (this needs to be defined for each application). The representative feature is updated first, according to its gradient value, followed by updates to other dependent features using function UPDATE DEP (line 32). We need to define the function UPDATE DEP for each application, but we use a set of building blocks that are reusable. Once all features in the family have been updated, there is a possibility that the update data point exceeds the allowed distance threshold from the original point. If that is the case, the algorithm backtracks and performs a binary search for the amount of perturbation added to the representative feature (until it finds a value for which the modified data point is inside the allowed region).
2. If the feature of maximum gradient does not belong to any feature family, then it can be updated independently from other features. The feature is updated using the standard gradient update rule (line 13). This is followed by a projection Π 2 within the feasible ball in L 2 norm.
We currently support two optimization objectives:
Objective for Projected attack. We set the objective G(x) = Z 1 (x), where Z 1 is the logit for the Malicious class, and Z 0 = 1 − Z 1 for the Benign class:
We need to ensure that the adversarial example is in the feasible set to respect the mathematical and physical constraints.
Objective for Penalty attack. The penalty objective for binary classification is equivalent to:
Algorithm 1 Framework for Evasion Attack with Constraints
Require: x, y: the input sample and its label; t: target label; C: prediction function; G: optimization objective; d max : maximum allowed perturbation; F S : subset of features that can be modified F D : features in F S that have dependencies; M : maximum number of iterations; α: learning rate. Ensure: x * : adversarial example or ⊥ if not successful.
1: Initialize m ← 0; x 0 ← x 2: // Iterate until successful or stopping condition 3: while C(x m )! = t and m < M do 4:
6:
i max ← argmax∇ S // Feature of max gradient in F S
7:
// Check if feature has dependencies 8: if i max ∈ F D then 9:
// Update dependent features with constraints 10:
// Gradient update and project to feasible region 13:
// Extract all dependent features on i max
23:
F imax ← Family Dep(i max ) 24: // Family representative feature 25: j ← Family Rep(F imax ) 26: δ ← ∇ j // Gradient of representative feature 27: // Initialization function before updating dependencies 28: s ← INIT FAMILY(m, x m , ∇, j) 29: // Binary search for perturbation starting from gradient 30: while δ = 0 do 31: 
IV. EVASION ATTACKS FOR CONCRETE SECURITY APPLICATIONS
We describe in this section our framework instantiated to two cyber security applications, a malicious network connection classifier, and a malicious domain classifier. We emphasize that our framework is applicable to other security applications, such as malware classification, website fingerprinting, and malicious communication detection. For each of these, the application-specific constraints need to be encoded and respected when feature updates are performed.
A. Malicious Connection Classifier
Network traffic includes important information about communication patterns between source and destination IP addresses. Classification methods have been applied to labeled network connections to determine malicious infections, such as those generated by botnets [6] , [11] , [30] , [43] . Network data comes in a variety of formats, but the most common include net flows, Bro logs, and packet captures.
Problem definition: dataset and features. We leverage a public dataset of botnet traffic that was captured in at the CTU University in the Czech Republic, called CTU-13 dataset [22] . The dataset include Bro connection logs with communications between internal IP addresses (on the campus network) and external ones. The dataset has the advantage of providing ground truth, i.e., labels of Malicious and Benign IP addresses. The goal of the classifier is to distinguish Malicious and Benign IP addresses on the internal network.
The fields available in Bro connection logs are given in Figure 2 . They include: the timestamp of the connection start; the source IP address; the source port; the destination IP address; the destination port; the number of packets sent and received; the number of bytes sent and received; and the connection duration (the time difference between when the last packet and first packets are sent). A TCP connection has a well-defined network meaning (a connection established between two IP addresses using TCP), while for UDP Bro aggregates all packets sent between source and destination IPs in a certain time interval (e.g., 30 seconds) to form a connection.
We define features for an internal IP address based on the communication it has with external IPs on various ports following the approach from [42] . A standard method for creating network features is aggregation by destination port to capture relevant traffic statistics per port [22] . This is motivated by the fact that different network services and protocols run on different ports, and we expect ports to have different traffic patterns. We select a list of 17 ports for popular applications, including: HTTP (80), SSH (22) , and DNS (53) . We also add a category called OTHER for connections on other ports. We aggregate the communication on a port based on a fixed time window (the length of which is a hyper-parameter). For each port, we compute traffic statistics using operators such as Max, Min, and Total separately for outgoing and incoming connections. See the example in Figure 2 , in which features extracted for each port define a family of dependent features. These are statistical dependencies between features, which need to be preserved upon performing the attack. We obtain a total of 756 aggregated traffic features on these 17 ports.
Physical constraints. We assume that the attacker controls the victim IP on the internal network (e.g., it was infected by a botnet). The attacker thus can determine what network traffic the victim IP will generate. As there are many legitimate applications that generate network traffic, we assume that the attacker can only add network connections (a safe assumption to preserve the functionality of the legitimate applications). When adding network connections, the attacker has some leverage in choosing the external IP destination, the port on which it communicates, the transport protocol (TCP or UDP), and how many packets and bytes it sends to the external destination. The attacker's goal is to have his connection feature vector classified as Benign. When adding network connections, the attacker needs to respect physical constraints imposed by network communication, as outlined below: 1. Use TCP and UDP protocols only if they are allowed on certain ports. For example, on port 995 both TCP and UDP are allowed, but port 465 is specific to TCP. 2. The TCP and UDP packet sizes are capped at 1500 bytes. We thus create range intervals for these values:
[tcp min, tcp max] and [udp min, udp max].
3. The duration of the connection is defined as the interval between when the last packet and the first packet is sent between source and destination. If the connection is idle for some time interval (e.g., 30 seconds), then it is closed by default in the Bro logs. The attacker can thus control the duration of the connection by sending packets at certain time intervals (to avoid closing the connection). We generate a range of valid protocol specific durations per packet range [tcp dmin, tcp dmax] and [udp dmin, udp dmax] from the distribution of connection duration in the training dataset.
Attack algorithm. The attack algorithm follows the framework from Algorithm 1, with the specific functions defined in Algorithm 2. First, the feature of maximum gradient is determined and the corresponding port is identified. The family of dependent features are all the features computed for that port. The attacker attempts to add a fixed number of connections on that port (which is a hyper-parameter of our system). This is done in the INIT FAMILY function (see Algorithm 2) . The attacker can add either TCP, UDP or both types of connections, according to the gradient sign for these features and also respecting network-level constraints. The representative feature for a port's family is the number of packets that the attacker sends in a connection. This feature is updated by the gradient value, following a binary search for perturbation δ, as specified in Algorithm UPDATE FAMILY.
In the UPDATE DEP function an update to the aggregated port features is performed. The difference in the total number of bytes sent by the attacker is determined from the gradient, followed by a projection operation to be within the feasible range for TCP and UDP packet sizes (function PROJECT).
The PROJECT function takes an input a value x and a range if ∇ TCP < 0 and IS ALLOWED(TCP, p) then 3:
x TCP ← x TCP + c 1
4:
UpdTCP ← True // Add UDP connections if allowed 5: if ∇ UDP < 0 and IS ALLOWED(UDP, p) then 6:
x UDP ← x UDP + c 2
7:
UpdUDP ← True if UpdTCP and UpdUDP then 14: // Project to respect physical constraints 15 : ∆ b ← PROJECT(∆ b , c 2 · udp min, c 2 · udp max) 22: n conn ← c 2 23:
x tot bytes ← x tot bytes + ∆ b // Update Min and Max dependencies for sent bytes 24: x min bytes ← Min(x min bytes , ∆ b /n conn )
25:
x max bytes ← Max(x max bytes , ∆ b /n conn ) // Update duration 26 :
28:
x tot dur ← x tot dur + ∆ d 29:
x min dur ← Min(x min dur , ∆ d /n conn )
30:
x max dur ← Max(x max dur , ∆ d /n conn ) distribution. The port family includes features such as Min and Max sent bytes and connection duration. These need to be updated because we add new connections, which might include higher or lower values for sent bytes and duration. For simplicity, we set the number of received packets and bytes to 0, as the attacker cannot control these values. In practice, this can be achieved by the attacker communicating with a non-existent remote IP, or communicating with an external IP under its control (for instance, the command-andcontrol IP controlled by the attacker). The other fields in Bro logs are not directly affecting the feature definition and can be sampled from the data (for instance, source port).
B. Malicious Domain Classifier
Problem definition: dataset and features. The second application is to classify domain names contacted by an enterprise hosts as Malicious or Benign. We use a dataset from [43] , that was collected by a company that includes 89 domain features extracted from HTTP proxy logs and domain labels. The features come from 7 families, and we include an example of several families in Table II .
Attack algorithm. In this application, we do not have access to the raw HTTP traffic, only to features extracted from it. The majority of constraints are mathematical constraints in the feature space. The attack algorithm follows the framework from Algorithm 1, with the specific functions defined in Algorithm 3. We support other families of dependencies, among which one that has includes both statistical and ratio dependencies (see the definition of the ratio features for bytes sent over received). We omit here the details. The important observation here is that the constraints update functions are reusable across applications, and they can be extended to support new mathematical dependencies.
Algorithm 3 Malicious Connection Classifier Attack
Require: Parse F as: T (total number of events); N (number of entities); X T , X min , X max , X avg (the total, min, max, and average number of events per entity). 8: // X T is representative feature. 9 :
Parse F as: N, N r , X 1 , . . . , X N such that:
The malicious domain dataset is larger and has more complex mathematical dependencies than the public malicious connection dataset. It offers us an opportunity to evaluate different optimization objectives and class imbalance ratios, as well as comparing with different baselines. We start with a description of the dataset in Section V-A, then we discuss ML model selection in Section V-B. In Section V-C we present results for the new attacks that overcome the limitations of the existing approaches. Next section we evaluate the malicious connection classifier.
A. Enterprise dataset
The data for training and testing the models was extracted from security logs collected by web proxies at the border of a large enterprise network with over 100,000 hosts. The number of monitored external domains in the training set is 227,033, among which 1730 are classified as Malicious and 225,303 are Benign. For training, we sampled a subset of training data to include all the Malicious domains, and a number of Benign domains to get several imbalance ratios between the two classes (1, 5, 15, 25, and 50) . We used 500 Malicious domains and 500 Benign domains for testing the attack. Overall, the dataset includes 89 features from 7 categories. We assume that the attacker can modify the features from the Communication category, as well as other features that do not have dependencies, a total of 31 features (see Table XIII in Appendix for their description). These features are organized in four families: Connection, Bytes, HTTP Method, and Result code.
B. Model Selection
Hyper-parameter selection. We first evaluate three standard classifiers with different hyper-parameters (logistic regression, random forest, and FFNN). The hyper-parameters for logistic regression and random forests are in Tables XI and XII from the Appendix. For logistic regression, the maximum AUC score of 87% is achieved with L 1 regularization with inverse regularization 2.89. For random forest, the maximum AUC of 91% is obtained with Gini Index criterion, maximum tree depth 13, minimum number of samples in leaves 3, and minimum samples for split 8.
The architectures used for FFNN are illustrated in Table III . The best performance was achieved with 2 hidden layers with 80 neurons in the first layer, and 50 neurons in the second layer. ReLU activation function is used after all hidden layers except for the last layer, which uses sigmoid (standard for binary classification). We used the Adam optimizer and SGD with different learning rates. The best results were obtained with Adam and learning rate of 0.0003. We ran training for 75 epochs with mini-batch size of 32. As a result, we obtained the model with AUC score 89% in cross-validation accuracy. Model comparison. After performing model selection for each type of model, we compare the three best resulting models. Figure 3a shows the ROC curves and AUC scores for a 1:1 imbalance ratio (with the same number of Malicious and Benign points used in training). The performance of FFNN is slightly worse than that of random forest, but it might be possible to improve these results with additional effort (note that for higher imbalance ratio the performance of FFNN improves, as shown in Figure 3b ). For the remainder of the section, we focus our discussion on the robustness of FFNN models.
Comparison of class imbalance for FFNN. Since the issue of class imbalance is a known challenge in cyber security [6] , we analyze the model accuracy as a function of imbalance ratio, showing the ROC curves in Figure 3b . Interestingly, the performance of the model increases to 93% AUC for imbalance ratio up to 25, after which it starts to decrease (with AUC of 83% at a ratio of 50). Our intuition is that the FFNN model achieves better performance when more training data is available (up to a ratio of 25). But once the Benign class dominates the Malicious one (at ratio of 50), the model performance starts to degrade.
C. Robustness to evasion attacks
After we train our models, we use a testing set of 500 Malicious and 500 Benign data points to evaluate the attack success rate. We vary the maximum allowed perturbation expressed as an L 2 norm and evaluate the success of the attack. We evaluate the two optimization objectives for Projected and Penalty attacks and compare with several baselines. We also run directly the C&W attack and show that it results in infeasible adversarial examples (as expected). We evaluate the success rate of the attacks for different imbalance ratios. We also perform some analysis of the features that are modified by the attack, and if they correlate with feature importance. Finally, we show an adversarial example generated by our method.
Existing Attack. We run the existing C&W attack [12] on our data in order to measure if the adversarial examples are feasible. While the performance of the attack is high and reaches 98% at distance 20 (for the 1:1 balanced case), the resulting adversarial examples are outside the feasibility region. An example is included in Table IV , showing that the average number of connections is not equal to the total number of connections divided by the number of IPs. Additionally, the average ratio of received bytes over sent bytes is not equal to maximum and minimum values of ratio (as it should be when the number of IPs is 1).
Projected attack results. We evaluate the success rate of the attack with Projected objective first for balanced classes (1:1 ratio). We compare in Figure 4a the attack against two baselines: Baseline 1 (in which the features that are modified iteratively are selected at random), and Baseline 2 (in which, additionally to random feature selection, the amount of perturbation is sampled from a standard normal distribution N (0, 1)). are classified correctly by the FFNN. The Projected attack improves both baselines, with Baseline 2 performing much worse, reaching success rate 57% at distance 20. By selecting the amount of perturbation according to our algorithm, Baseline 1 gets an attack success rate of 91.7% at distance 20, compared to the Projected attack success of 98.3% at the same distance. This shows that the attacks is still performing reasonably if feature selection is done randomly, but it is very important to add perturbation to features consistent with the optimization objective. We also measure in Figure 4b the decrease of the model's performance with and without the presence of the attack at different perturbation upper bounds (using 500 Malicious and 500 Benign examples). While AUC score is 0.87 without the attack, it drastically decreases to 0.52 already at L 2 distance 7. This shows the significant degradation of the model's performance under attack.
Finally, we ran the attack at different imbalance ratios and measured its success rate with respect to maximum allowed perturbation. The results are illustrated in Figure 4c . In this experiment, we select 62 test examples which all models (trained for different imbalance ratios) classified correctly before the attack. At the L 2 distance of 20 the attack achieves 100% success rate for all ratios except 1. Additionally, we observe that with higher imbalance, it is easier for the attacker to find adversarial examples (at fixed maximum distance). One reason for this is that models that have lower performance initially (as the one trained with 1:50 imbalance ratio) are easier to attack. Second, we believe that as the imbalance gets higher the model becomes more biased towards the majority class (Benign), which is the target class of the attacker in our case, and it is easier to cross the decision boundary between classes (independent of the model's accuracy).
Penalty attack results. We now discuss the results achieved by applying our attack with the Penalty objective on the testing examples. Similar to the Projected attack, we compare the success rate of the Penalty attack to the two types of baseline attacks (for balanced classes), in Figure 5a (using the 412 Malicious testing examples classified correctly). Overall, the Penalty objective is performing worse than the Projected one, reaching 79% success rate at L 2 distance of 20. We observe that in this case both baselines perform worse, and the attack improves upon both baselines significantly. The decrease of model's performance under the Penalty attack is illustrated in Figure 5b (for 500 Malicious and 500 Benign testing examples). While AUC is 0.87 before the attack, it decreases to 0.59 already at distance 7. Furthermore, we measure the attack success rate at different imbalance ratios in Figure 5c (using the 62 testing examples classified correctly by all models). For each ratio value we searched for the best hyper-parameter c between 0 and 1 with step 0.05. Here, as with the Projected attack, we see the same trend: as the imbalance ratio gets higher, the attack performs better, and it works best at imbalance ratio of 50. Attack comparison. We compare the success rate of the two objectives (Projected and Penalty) with the C&W attack, as well as an attack we call Post-processing. The Postprocessing attack runs directly the original C&W developed for continuous domains, after which it projects the adversarial example to the feasible space to enforce the constraints. In the Post-processing attack, we look at each family of dependent features, keep the value of the representative feature as selected by the attack, but then modify the values of the dependent features using the UPDATE DEP function. The success rate of all these attacks is shown in Figure 6 , using the 412 Malicious testing examples classified correctly. The attacks based on our framework (with Projected and Penalty objectives) perform best, as they account for feature dependencies during the adversarial point generation. The attack with the Projected objective has the highest performance (we suspect that the Penalty attack is sensitive to parameter c). The vanilla C&W has slightly worse performance at small perturbation values, even though it does not take into consideration the feature constraints and works in an enlarged feature space. Interestingly, the Post-processing attack performs worse (reaching only 0.005% success at distance 20 -can generate 2 out of 412 adversarial examples). This demonstrates that it is not sufficient to run state-of-art attacks for continuous domains and then adjust the feature dependencies, but more sophisticated attack strategies are needed.
Number of features modified. We compare the number of features modified during the attack iterative algorithm to construct the adversarial examples for three attacks: Projected, Penalty, and C&W. The histogram for the number of modified features is illustrated in Figure 7a . It is not surprising that the C&W attack modifies almost all features, as it works in L 2 norms without any restriction in feature space. Both the Projected and the Penalty attacks modify a much smaller number of features (4 on average).
We are interested in determining if there is a relationship between feature importance and choice of feature by the attack. For additional details on feature description, we include the list of features that can be modified in Table XIII in the Appendix. In Figure 7b we plot the number of modifications for each feature (left axis) and feature importance (right axis). We observe that feature importance is correlated with the attack's feature choice. However, since we are modifying the representative feature in each family, the number of modifications on the representative feature is usually higher (it accumulates all the importance of the features in that family). For the Bytes family, feature 3 (number of received bytes) is the representative feature and it is updated more than 350 times. However, for features that have no dependencies (e.g., 68 -number of levels in the domain, 69 -number of sub-domains, 71 -domain registration age, and 72 -domain registration validity), the number of updates is correlated with feature importance. Adversarial examples. Finally, we include an adversarial example in Table V for the Projected attack. We only show the features that are modified by the attack and their original value. As we observe, the attack preserves the feature dependencies: the average ratio of received bytes over sent bytes (Avg Rtaio Bytes) is consistent with number of received (Total Recv Bytes) and sent (Total Sent Bytes) bytes. In addition, the attack modifies the domain registration age, a relevant feature in malicious domain classification [40] . In this application we have access to raw network connections (in Bro log format), which provides the opportunity We start with a description of the CTU-13 dataset in Section VI-A, then we show the performance of FFNN for connection classification in Section VI-B. Finally, we present the analysis on model robustness in Section VI-C.
A. CTU-13 dataset
CTU-13 is a collection of 13 scenarios including both legitimate traffic from the campus network, as well as labeled connections of malicious botnets [22] . We restrict to three scenarios for the Neris botnet (1, 2, and 9) . We choose to train on two of the scenarios and test the models on the third, to guarantee independence between training and testing data. The training data has 3869 Malicious examples, 194,259 Benign examples, and an imbalance ratio of 1:50. There is a set of 432 statistical features that the attacker can modify (the ones that correspond to the characteristics of sent traffic). The physical constraints and statistical dependencies on bytes and duration have been detailed in Section IV-A.
B. Classification results
We perform model selection and training for a number of FFNN architectures on all combinations of two scenarios, and tested the models for generality on the third scenario. The best architecture is illustrated in Table VI . It consists of three layers with 256, 128 and 64 hidden layers. We used the Adam optimizer, 50 epochs for training, mini-batch of 64, and a learning rate of 0.00026. The F1 and AUC scores for all combinations of training scenarios are illustrated in Table VII . We also compared the performance of FFNN with logistic regression and random forest, but we omit the results (FFNN achieved similar performance to random forest). For the adversarial attacks, we choose the scenarios with best performance: training on 1, 9, and testing on 2.
C. Robustness to evasion attacks
We show the Projected attack's performance, discuss which ports were updated most frequently, and show an adversarial examples and the corresponding Bro logs records. The testing data for the attack is 407 Malicious examples from scenario 2, among which 397 were predicted correctly by the classifier.
Attack performance. First, we analyze the attack success rate with respect to the allowed perturbation, shown in Figure 8a . The attack reaches 99% success rate at L 2 distance 16. Interestingly, in this case the two baselines perform poorly, demonstrating the clear advantages of our framework. We plot next the ROC curves under attack in Figure 8b . At distance 8, the AUC score is 0.93 (compared to 0.98 without the attack), but there is a sudden change at distance 10, with AUC score dropping to 0.77. Moreover, at distance 12, the AUC reaches 0.12, showing the significant degradation under attack with relatively small distance.
Ports family statistics. We show the average number of port families updated during the attack in Figure 8c . The maximum number is 3 ports (at smaller distance), but it decreases to 1 port at distance higher than 12. While counter-intuitive, this can be explained by the fact that at larger distances the attacker can add larger perturbation to the aggregated statistics of one port, crossing the decision boundary.
In Table X we include the port families selected during attack, at distance 8, as well as their importance. The port importance was computed by summing up the importances of all the features in the port's family. Ports 443, 80, and OTHER were updated most frequently, and have highest importance. Table IX ). The destination IP can be selected by the attacker so that it does not exist or it does not respond (we assumed the number of received bytes and packets is 0). Interestingly, all adversarial attacks succeed with at most 12 new connections for distances higher than 10.
VII. RELATED WORK
Adversarial machine learning is a field that studies the vulnerabilities of ML against attacks [31] . Research on the robustness of DNNs at testing time started with the work of Biggio et al. [9] and Szegedy et al. [55] . They showed that classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples generated with minimal perturbation to testing inputs. Since then, the area of adversarial ML has received a lot of attention, with the majority of work focused on evasion attacks (at testing time), e.g., [4] , [12] , [24] , [36] , [44] , [45] . Other classes of attacks include poisoning (e.g., [10] , [60] ) and privacy attacks (e.g., [20] , [51] ), but we focus here on evasion attacks.
Evasion attacks in security. Several evasion attacks have been proposed against models with discrete and constrained input vectors, as encountered in security applications.
The majority of these use datasets with binary features, not considering dependencies in feature space. Biggio Evasion attacks in other domains. There is work on designing attacks in other domains, such as audio: [23] , [14] , [63] , [52] , [49] , [62] , [13] [48]; text: [46] , [17] , [39] , [21] , [1] ; and video: [38] , [29] , [59] . Physically realizable attacks have been designed for face recognition [50] and vision [18] .
Certified defenses. Recent research on certified defenses against evasion attacks aims to obtain provable guarantees of error under attack under worst-case adversaries. [7] , [15] , [19] , [28] , [37] , [58] . Robustness is the proof that the model's decision is stable in the L p ball around the input vector. However, all this work considers continuous domains such as images, and is difficult to extend to discrete domains.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The absence of robustness guarantee in FFNNs limit the application of Deep Learning in the variety of critical applications. We showed that evasion attacks against feed-forward neural networks are a real threat for cyber security applications. We proposed a general framework that can create adversarial examples respecting mathematical dependencies and physical-world constraints imposed by security applications. We demonstrated evasion attacks that insert a small number of network connections (12 records in Bro connection logs) to mis-classify Malicious activity as Benign in a malicious connection classifier. Future work in this space includes the design of reliable defenses with provable guarantees, as well as exploring attackers with more limited capabilities (e.g., blackbox attacks). was also sponsored by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory and was accomplished under Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-13-2-0045 (ARL Cyber Security CRA). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation here on.
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APPENDIX
We include the hyper-parameters for logistic regression and random forest in Tables XI and XII, Entropy, Gini Index Tree depth [2, 19] , step = 1 Split range [2, 9] , step = 1 Leaf range [1, 5] , step = 1 
